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TAX COMMENT

II. An annuity payable out of the corpus of the trust
in the event of an inadequacy of income is taxable to the
fiduciary, 29 but only to the extent that such annuity is met
with payments from the income of the trust, there being, of
course, no tax liability for such part of the annuity as is
met with disbursements from the corpus. Such an annuity
is not taxable to the recipient,30 even although, in a given
taxable year, the entire payment is met with income.
JOHN
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GAIN OR Loss TO REMAINDERMAN OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY

BEQUEST, DEVISE

OR

INHERITANCE.--The basis prescribed under the

Revenue Acts of 1924, 1926 and prior acts,' for determining gain
or loss upon the disposition of property acquired by bequest, devise
or inheritance, has resulted in much confusion, due to the contradictory interpretations of the acts by the courts, the Board of Tax
Appeals and the Treasury Department. These acts 2 specifically provide that, "in case of property acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance, the basis (i. e., for determining gain or loss upon a subsequent
sale) should be the fair market value of such property at the time
of such acquisition." The Treasury Department's consistent attitude
has been that in case of property (real and personal) acquired as a
result of death, the date of acquisition was the date. of the death of
decedent. 3 This contention was based on the theory that immediately
upon the decedent's death, a vested equitable interest in the property
was acquired by the legatees. Upon distribution of the property,
their title reverts to the date of death. The Board of Tax Appeals,
however, held that the date of acquisition of property by specific
legatees 4 and residuary legatees 5 was the date when the property
bequeathed was actually distributed and made available to them, the
value on that date being the basis for determining gain or loss upon a
subsequent sale of the property by the legatees. 6 The Treasury
Helvering v. Pardee, supra note 23.

- Burnet v. Whitehouse, supra note 3.
OF

1
REVENUE AcT OF 1924 §204 (a), (5), Reg. 65, art. 1594; REVENUE AcT
1926 §204 (A), (5), Reg. 69, art. 1594; REVENUE ACT OF 1921 §202 (a),

(3), is substantially identical.
-Ibid.
Reg. 74, art. 595; art. 1594, Regs. 69 and 65; Reg. 62, art. 1563; Reg.
45, art. 1562.
'Brewster v. Gage, 25 F. (2d) 915 (1927); Moser v. Commissioner, 12
B. T. A. 672 (1928).
'Foster v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 1137 (1927); Mathiessen v. United
States, 65 particularly,
Ct. Cl. 484 (1928).
Mathiessen v. United States, supra note 5.
' See,
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Department's interpretation with respect to the basis under the 1926
and prior acts was finally upheld by the Supreme Court in the case
of Brewster v. Gage.7 In that case, despite the forceful argument
of counsel for the appellant 8 that the date of distribution should
control, the Court held that "the right of a residuary legatee to have
his share of the residue after administration, vests immediately upon
the testator's death. The decree of distribution confers no new right,
it merely identifies the property remaining * * *."
"The legal
title so given relates back to the date of the death." 9 As a result of
this, the Court of 'Claims' decision, 10 holding that a residuary legatee
"acquires property only upon actual distribution to him," is no
longer valid, under the Revenue Act of 1926 and earlier acts.
In respect to remaindermen this situation has given rise to
two interesting aspects:
(1)

where the interest of the remainderman is vested;

(2)

where it is contingent.

and
As to when a remainderman's interest is to be deemed vested and
when contingent, the Department's interpretation has varied. An
early ruling held that the date when the remainder vests in possession
was the date of acquisition." Subsequently, this was overruled and
the Department took the stand that the property is acquired when the
13
interest vests in right, 12 although it may be subject to be divested.
The rule established in the Brewster case has been applied in cases
where the property is held pending the outcome of litigation,'1 4 or
during the intervention of a life estate,' 5 or due to suspended distribution caused by a testamentary trust,'

6

even where the will pro-

vides for distribution to the residuary legatee at future dates, and
"280 U. S. 327, 334, 50 Sup. Ct. 115 (1930), aff'd, 30 F. (2d) 604, rev'g,
25 F. (2d) 915 (see supra note 4) ; Riddle, Adm. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl.
332, 38 F. (2d) 527 (1930), reversing an earlier contra opinion held similarly.
8 In the Brewster case (supra note 10) counsel argued that "to hold that
property vests and is taxable at death of testator is to say that an increase or
decrease in income is chargeable to taxpayer, before the property is subject to
his disposition and control."
9 Foster v. Foster, 20 Pick. 67, 70 (Mass.
); Wager v. Wager, 89 N.
Y. 161, 166 (1882); Thompson v. Thomas, 30 Miss. 152, 158.
10 Mathiessen v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 484, certiorari denied, 278 U. S.
609, 49 Sup. Ct. 13 (1928).
' L. 0. 649 (unpublished) cited in Sol. Op. 35, C. B. 3, 50.
Sol. Op. 35, C. B. 3, 50.
0. D. 694, C. B. 3, 53.
"Chapman, Jr., as Executor v. Commissibner, 19 B. T. A. 105 (1930).
"Griscom v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 979 (1931).
"' Chandler v. Field, 58 F. (2d) 370 (1932); Estate of Abelis et al. v.
Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 435 (1931) ; Security Trust Company, now Detroit
Trust Co. et al., Trustees, 25 B. T. A. 29 (1931) ; Barber Trusts v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 513 (1932) ; Pringle et al. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A.
362 (1932).
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for other disposition of the property in the event of death prior to
such distribution.17 Consistent with these holdings, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at a similar conclusion in the
8
case of Molter v. Commissioner.1
In this case the testator, who died
in February, 1919, made provision in his will that, upon death of
the life tenant, the taxpayer was to receive one-fourth of the estate,
and was to receive the remaining three-fourths in payments of onefourth of the residue each second year thereafter. If the taxpayer
predeceased the life tenant the corpus of the estate was to go to
taxpayer's lineal descendants. The life tenant died on April 25,
1923. The petitioner, in making her returns for 1925 and 1926,
proceeded on the theory that under the terms of the will she had
received a contingent remainder and that she actually (in view of
the statute) acquired the property in 1923 and 1925. Therefore,
she contended that the basis for determining gain or loss was the
fair market value of the property in those respective years. Mr.
Chief justice Sparks, speaking for a unanimous Court, decided that
the taxpayer acquired a vested interest in the property, as the provision for periodic payments did not render the remainder contingent, 19 and the basis for the gain or loss of property actually
delivered to her by the trustee of the estate in 1923 and 1925 was the
value at the date of testator's death on February 13, 1919. The
same Court four days later was presented with an appeal, treating
with substantially the same problem. 20 In this case the Court was
called upon to determine whether a remainderman (taxpayer), who
was given securities in 1926 under a testamentary trust created in
1915 had acquired them under the statute at the date of actual distribution (1926) or at the date of testator's death (1915). Again,
Mr. Chief Justice Sparks, speaking for the Court, held that the rule
as laid down in the Brewster case 21 is applicable and is extended
to this case; that therefore petitioner acquired the securities, even
though possession was to be postponed for an indefinite period, at
the date of testator's death, and that their value at that date is the
basis for gain or loss on a subsequent sale in 1927.22
"' Chandler v. Field, supra note 16; May et aL v. Commissioner, 26 B. T.
A. 1413 (1932).
" U. S. C. C. A. 7th Circuit, decided January 22, 1934, aff'g, 27 B. T.
A. 442.
"' Smith v. Chester, 272 Ill. 428, 112 N. E. 325 (1916); GAY, RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1906) §108; Hertzig v. Goetten, 347 Ill. 619, 180 N.
E. 428 (1932) ; Schofield v. Olcott, 120 Ill. 362, 11 N. E. 351 (1887); Drucker
v. Burnham, 146 "11.9, 34 N. E. 558 (1893) ; Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368,
52 N. E. 934 (1898); Chapin v. Crow, 147 Ill. 219, 35 N. E. 536 (1893);
Armstrong v. Barber, 239 Ill. 389, 88 N. E. 246 (1909); Walker v. Walker,
283 Ill. 11, 118 N. E. 1014 (1918) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N. E.
339 (1905).
.Hopkins v. Commissioner, U. S. C. C. A. 7th Circuit, decided January
26, 1934,
aff'g, 27 B. T. A. 845.
21
Supra note 7.
" Huggett v. Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 705, rev'g, 24 B. T. A. 669 (1933);
Chandler v. Field, 63 F. (2d) 13, certiorari denied, 289 U. S. 758 (1933);
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It is evident from even a superficial reading of the portion of
the statute relating to this question (Revenue Act of 1926 and prior
acts) ,23 and from the cases attempting logically to interpret it that
its provisions are exceedingly ambiguous and are productive of
controversy, especially in the determination of the date of acquisition
of the property. This confusion has been eliminated to a great
extent by the legislature in its passage of the Revenue Act of 1928.
This Act provides : 24
"If personal property was acquired by specific bequest
or if real property was acquired by general or specific devise
or by intestacy the basis shall be the fair market value of the
property at the time of the death of the decedent * * *. In
all other cases if the property was acquired either by will or
by intestacy, the basis shall be the fair market value of the
property at the time of the distribution to the taxpayer." 25
The above-quoted provision of the 1928 Act is continued without
change in the Revenue Act of 1932.26
In Lane v. Corwin 27 (interpreting the Revenue Act of 1928) it
was held that the basis of property in the hands of beneficiaries who
received it at the termination of a testamentary trust for their benefit
is the value of the property at the time of its transfer to the trust
pursuant to the direction of the will. However, if the. cestui has a
mere contingent interest in the trust, so that "distribution" to him
does not occur until the termination of the trust, the basis is the fair
market value of the corpus at the time of such termination. The
test is whether or not the interest of the cestui becomes substantially
vested when the property is distributed to the testamentary trustee. 28
SEYMOUR SALS.

Lane v. Corwin, 63 F. (2d) 767 (1933) ; Security Trust Co. v. Commissioner,

25 B. T. A. 29 (1931); Rodman E. Griscom v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 979

(1931).

' Supra note 1.
'§113 (a), (5).
'The "general" devise which is contemplated by the statute is evidently
synonymous with the more commonly employed term of "residuary" devise.
The status under the new statutory terminology of remainders created by will
is uncertain. It is believed, however, that the general language of the statute
applies to remainders, vested and contingent alike, and that the basis for the
sale of property by a remainderman either before or after the property has
vested in possession is the fair market value of the remainder at the time of
the death of the decedent. KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1929) 847.

1§113 (a), (5).
'1 Fed. Supp. 151 (1933).
'A full statement of the Department's position on this point is contained
in G. C. M. 10260, I. B. B. XI-13, 2, as modified in G. C. M. 10698, I. R.

B. XI-28, 6.

